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Abstract: 
 
 Proponents of the semantic approach to scientific theories (e.g. Giere 1988, 2004; French 
and Ladyman 1999) cite a number of critical publications as the origins of their positions.  While 
the semantic view experienced widespread adoption by philosophers of science in the decades 
leading up to the 1990s, over the last two decades opposition to the view has increased 
demonstrably (e.g. Downes 1992; Cartwright et al. 1995).  This growing disaffection suggests a 
two-part question: What exactly are the objections to the semantic view of scientific theories, 
and does the view have the conceptual resources to combat its opposition?  This essay seeks to 
answer this question by performing a careful analysis of the positions of both advocates and 
adversaries of the semantic view.  In addition, it is argued that to save the semantic view it is 
necessary to locate the source of the position’s problems and to retool its conceptual foundations.  
To ensure that the semantic approach has the resources to meet objections to it, exegetical 
analysis is performed, which demonstrates that the source of the view’s present-day woes lies in 
a subtle conflation contained in one seminal articulation of the view, van Fraassen’s The 
Scientific Image.  It is argued that supplanting central aspects of that work with ideas from 
Suppes is the remedy needed to provide the semantic view with the necessary resources for 
becoming wholly defensible against its oppositions. 
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One of the besetting sins of philosophers of science is to overly simplify the 
structure of science.  Philosophers who write about the representation of 
scientific theories as logical calculi then go on to say that a theory is given 
empirical meaning by providing interpretations or coordinating definitions for 
some of the primitive or defined terms of the calculus.  What I have attempted to 
argue is that a whole hierarchy of models stands between the model of basic 
theory and the complete experimental experience.  
 
      – Patrick Suppes [1962] 1969, 34. 
 
Introduction 
A perennial niche in philosophy of science is that of characterizing science via the structure of 
scientific theories.  Long ago, the “received view” of scientific theories that was dominant for 
many decades became known as the “standard sketch” of scientific theories (Suppes 1967).  That 
it is was a mere sketch was not necessarily cause for its rejection, but rather served as motivation 
for its enrichment.  The process of wholly reevaluating, partially rejecting, and partially 
extending the sketch has resulted in a new received view of scientific theories, which is known as 
the ‘semantic view’, the ‘model-theoretic approach’, the ‘model view’, or pejoratively, the 
‘theory-driven view of models’. 
 The semantic view was developed during the 1960s and 1970s by a number of authors 
working in relative independence from one another.  By 1989, one of its early champions could 
say, “The Semantic Conception of Theories today probably is the philosophical analysis of the 
nature of theories most widely held among philosophers of science” (Suppes 1989, 3).  However, 
the view has come under sustained attack in the ensuing two decades (e.g. Downes 1992; 
Cartwright et al. 1995; Cartwright 1999; Morgan and Morrison 1999; Sloep and Van Der Steen 
1987; Suárez 2003; Ereshefsky 1991; Godfrey-Smith 2006).  One of the central contentions of 
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this paper is that the reason these attacks appear so successful is that there is no single locus 
classicus of the semantic approach. 
 Contemporary advocates of the view (e.g. Giere 1988, 2004; French and Ladyman 1999; 
Da Costa and French 1990; Lloyd 1994; Schaffner 1993; Teller 2001) routinely cite the work of 
Beth (1949), Suppes (1957, 1960, 1962, 1967, 1969), Suppe (1974, 1989), and van Fraassen 
(1970, 1980, 1985, 1989) as points of origin for their own positions.  Patently, this is a diffuse 
point of origination.  It might be wondered how, given the many authors whom may rightly bear 
the attribution of the semantic view’s fountainhead, it is possible to have a univocal 
interpretation of the position at all?  Moreover, without such a unified interpretation, how can the 
position be defended against its steadfast opposition? 
 Indeed, answering these questions will be the focus of this paper.  It will be argued here 
that there is no exclusive interpretation of the semantic approach to scientific theories; rather the 
position is more programmatic, and consists of a definitely articulable range of positions.  To 
save the semantic view, we must characterize these positions, compare them, and decide which 
one is the most defensible.  To do this, I will begin by recapitulating a common complex 
objection to the semantic approach and rebuttals to it (Sections 1 and 2).  Pursuing the problem 
in this fashion culminates in a portrait of the semantic approach from the vantage points of both 
friend and foe.  Surprisingly, though there are differences between these pictures, their 
similarities are most striking.  Section 3 will pinpoint the textual source of the commonalities 
found in countervailing contemporaneous assessments of the view through an analysis of van 
Fraassen’s (1980) influential depiction of the semantic program.  I will conclude by arguing for 
renewed attention to the work of Suppes as a means to reintroducing heretofore-unacknowledged 
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resources that are necessary for developing a thoroughgoing defensible interpretation of the 
semantic view (Section 4). 
 
1. What’s wrong with the semantic view? 
In order to understand what the semantic program is, it will be useful to begin by understanding 
what is purportedly wrong with it.  As the semantic view was not unambigously proposed fully 
formed by a single philosopher at one time, while it spread through the ranks of philosophers, it 
became many things to many people.  The purpose of this essay is to bring these distinguishable 
threads together and illustrate what core allegiances they share; once elucidated, this will be 
taken as the semantic program.  Though it may seem arbitrary to begin the process of 
characterizing a position with its adversaries, this is not so.  Such a beginning will bring 
differences between the statements of its advocates into sharper relief, and as such will 
ultimately enable a more nuanced appreciation of the depth and richness that the program 
affords. 
 In what follows I take the criticisms found in writings by Downes and what I call the 
London group as a comprehensive representation of extant opposition to the semantic approach.  
While their criticisms are launched at different proponents of the position, these two parties share 
the view that something is quite right about the semantic program; namely, its emphasis on the 
importance of models in science.  At a course grain, they also share the same method, which is to 
construct a version of the semantic view to attack, as well as to submit the same complex 
objection against it.  
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1.1 Downes on the semantic view 
In his criticism of the semantic view, Downes notes that the position has no univocal 
interpretation, which is taken as a license to introduce a working definition of the view to be the 
target for criticism: 
“Here is the definition: Scientific theories consist of families of (mathematical) models 
including empirical models and sets of hypotheses stating the connections between the 
empirical models and empirical systems” (1992, 143) 
Taken one way, this is a strong formulation of the semantic program because it requires theories 
to be families of mathematical models.  However, there is also a weaker interpretation of this 
definition to be had, given the use of parentheses.  It could be that theories consist of families of 
models, regardless of whether this refers exhaustively to mathematical models.  Indeed, this 
possibility is exactly what Downes targets when articulating his disaffection; he is concerned that 
there are multiple types of models in science, and as stated the position can not incorporate the 
majority of them. 
 Against the semantic view, Downes objects that it contains an intolerant notion of model, 
and that this skews our perception of how scientific theories have empirical import. Downes 
considers three different models. The first is a set of mathematical postulates and a model 
derived from them, which is a triangle.  The second is an equation from ecological theory 
describing logistic growth, of which he claims a model is found in the relations between 
mathematical objects in the equation.  The third is a typical biology textbook drawing of a cell, 
which, according to Downes, “is an idealized cell or model” (146).  He contends that considering 
how these types of models could be handled by the semantic approach will indicate its weak 
points. 
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 According to Downes, on the semantic account, the way to represent the connections 
between the models that constitute a theory and experimental (empirical) systems is in terms of 
isomorphism.  Taken as a mathematical notion, isomorphism corresponds to an exact (one-to-
one) mapping between two sets that preserves the relations between the entities in the domain 
under consideration. Trivially, on the face of it the third model contains no mathematics, so it is 
difficult to see how it could be handled by the semantic view, as interpreted above.  Similarly, 
though the ecological model is generated within a mathematical framework, when applied to 
experimental systems it does not appear to exhibit an isomoporphic relation to such systems, 
when isomorphism is taken in a strict mathematical sense.  This suggests that it too is poorly 
characterized by the semantic account, or that the notion of isomorphism is too strict to be 
applied in either case.  By Downes’ lights, both points ought to be recognized, which leads him 
to propose a “deflationary” account of the semantic view. 
 The deflationary account amounts to the view that model construction and usage is 
essential to science.  Also, that the notion of models on the semantic approach must be made 
more inclusive so as to tolerate the types of examples given by Downes.  Additionally, 
something more lenient than the notion of isomorphism will be needed to describe the 
relationship between theories, models, and empirical systems.  Following Giere, Downes 
suggests that the notion of similarity may be sufficient for this job. 
 For the present purposes there are two points of interest in Downes’ text.  One is its 
portrayal of the semantic view as being potentially committed to a limiting notion of model.  
Another point is that the objection lodged against the account criticized is complex insofar as it 
contains two parts: first it is argued that the notion of models is too restrictive; second it is 
argued that the characterization of the relationship between theories and the world must be 
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modified.  These two features are also found in another prominent opposition to the semantic 
program. 
 
1.2 The London group: against a ‘theory-driven view’ 
A number of authors who share a connection to the London School of Economics have 
collaborated to oppose what they term a ‘theory-driven view of models’, of which the semantic 
view is only one instantiation (e.g. Cartwright 1999; Cartwright et. al 1995; Morgan and 
Morrison 1999; Suarez 2003).  While these authors share the same criticisms as Downes, they 
illustrate an alternative way to express them.  They too believe that there are multiple realizations 
of models in science; however the London group is keen to focus on the contention that the 
semantic view cannot account for the way theories and models relate to the world.  
 Like Downes, the London group paints a particular picture of the position they wish to 
combat. According to them, the theory-driven view has it that: 
“a theory is a set of models and the representative models are to be found among 
these…theory generally provides only ideal models, generally simple ideal models.  To 
treat real, complex phenomena, more and more factors true of the real situation are added 
into the ideal model until a good enough representation of the phenomena is achieved” 
(Suárez and Cartwright 2008, 64-65).   
As a representation of the semantic view, it should be noted that this portrayal already takes 
some license by including the notion of representative models in the definition of the position to 
be assailed.  This notion is the London group’s own, and such models are those that are intended 
to be reasonably accurate portrayals of the phenomena, including their sources.  As will be clear 
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below, depending on how one understand ‘phenomena’, this may be a slanted caricature of the 
view they oppose in favor of the one they defend. 
 The London group seeks to supplant the theory-driven view with another position, which 
comes with its own “slogan: ‘Models mediate between theory and reality’” (ibid).  Models 
mediate because they are autonomous from theory.  In this way they play essential roles in 
science that are independent from their role in constituting theory.  Furthermore, models are 
distinct from theories insofar as they have a different relationship to the world, which is 
independent of any relationship theory has to world.  On this interpretation of the semantic 
account, if phenomena are what are beheld in ones experience of the world, then the London 
group contends the view does not adequately explicate the relationship between theories, models, 
and phenomena (world). 
 The reasons the London group give for disputing the adequacy of the semantic view stem 
from a careful case study, the careful recapitulation of which will not be important for the 
present purposes.  What will be focused upon instead is what they take their case study to 
demonstrate in relation to the view they oppose. They argue their case study makes it clear that 
models accounting for phenomena are not derived from theory in a logical sense, nor are they 
even generated from theory by filling in the theory’s parameters with measured values.  Rather, 
models that represent reality are constructed by ad hoc appeals to whatever theories are 
necessary to account for phenomena, irrespective of how they comports with any theory under 
consideration.  In the London group’s words, their case is one where some models are built such 
“that while providing accurate representations [they] do not follow from theory either by de-
idealisation or by introducing otherwise acceptable descriptions of the facts” (70).  
Consequently, some models are not generated by way of theories.  Hence, because the theory-
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driven view takes this to be the sole mode of genesis for models, it is mistaken.  Moreover, 
because of this the theory driven view lacks the resources to describe how models or theories 
relate to the world. 
 
1.3 The semantic program as it appears to its opponents 
Between them, the contentions of Downes and the London group make clear what is wrong with 
the semantic view, provided the position is the same as that which they oppose.  From the above 
discussion it is evident that the semantic view has the following characteristics to those who 
disagree with it: 
• Scientific theories are to be identified with families of ‘models’. 
• The exact nature of said models is unclear, however they are routinely taken to be set-
theoretical (mathematical) structures.  Yet, it remains possible to conceive of the view as 
incorporating a broader notion of model. 
• Models are generated from theories in a sense analogous to formal derivation.  Making 
this comport with a broader notion of model appears difficult. 
• Theories relate to the world by way of models.  Models qua set-theoretic structures relate 
by a relationship of isomorphism.  Alternative depictions of models might be said to 
relate to the world by a relationship of similarity. 
Advocates of the semantic program have responded to the objections just discussed.  We will 
now turn to them to further enrich our picture of the semantic program, as it is understood in 
contemporary philosophy of science.  
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2. Two strategies for defending the semantic program. 
By taking the same exegetical approach to recent attempts to defend the view as was taken with 
its opponents, it will become apparent how the semantic program looks to those who champion 
it.  Amongst those who defend the semantic view, the objections discussed above are 
commonplace and have received considerable attention.  While it is not unexpected that the 
view’s advocates portray it differently than its assailants, what is unusual is that proponents 
readily agree to most features of their opponents’ portrayals of the view.  Because of this, it has 
become impossible to develop a wholly defensible interpretation of the semantic program.  
Instead, aspects of it are cordoned off and defended piecemeal, which ultimately damages the 
view’s tenability. 
 Contemporaneous defenses of the semantic approach are split into two camps that cite the 
same points of origin for their positions, however they deploy different methods and defend 
different interpretations of the program.  For reasons that will become clear, these camps will be 
referred to as the formalist and liberalist strategies. 
 
2.1 The formalist strategy for defending the semantic program  
One approach to combating the problems confronting the semantic approach is to tackle them 
head on using sophisticated formal techniques.  A particularly prominent adopter of this strategy 
is French, who has worked with a number of collaborators to develop a rigorous specification of 
the semantic view called ‘the model-theoretic approach’ (e.g. Da Costa and French 1990; French 
and Ladyman 1999).  In a recent paper with Ladyman, the complex objections discussed above 
are bifurcated into problem-areas: 
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“(1) the model-theoretic representation of the kinds of models employed in scientific 
practice – such as iconic and material models; 
(2) the model-theoretic representation of the relationship between theories and 
phenomena.”  (French and Ladyman 1999, 103-104) 
In this sense, a pivotal move defenders of the semantic view make is to divide the problem and 
then solve its components piecemeal.  French and Ladyman argue that doing so allows them to 
decisively meet the first issue. 
 French and coauthors follow the work of Suppes by contending that a scientific theory 
can be represented by a set-theoretic predicate, defined in accordance with their methods   With 
such an approach they purportedly “can reproduce all extant mathematics (and practically all of 
scientific our thinking as well)” (Da Costa and French 1990, 253; italics in original). With 
scientific theories so represented, meeting problem number is not very difficult.  The question is 
not whether ‘model’, as employed by scientists, comports with their approach, but whether the 
practice of representing science using set theoretic structures can adequately depict the various 
types of models one find scientists using. 
 The sorts of models French and coauthors seek to represent using their formalisms are 
iconic models or material models, such as the cell model discussed by Downes or the famous 
physical model of DNA proposed by Watson and Crick, respectively.  With their formal account 
on hand, French and Ladyman claim, “to present iconic models, material models, and so on, at 
the level of philosophical analysis, is to present certain (partial) set-theoretical structures.  
Thus…the issue is how they should be represented so as to best capture relevant aspects of 
[scientific] practice” (1999, 107; italics in original). 
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 The formal technique deployed by French and collaborators stems from work in set 
theory and mathematics (see Da Costa and French 1990 for references).  Here I will suppress 
their notational formalisms and focus solely on how they contend their formalisms do the work 
they take it to do, and what work that is, exactly.  According to the formalist strategy, a theory 
may be identified with the class of set-theoretic models it entails.  Each such model is a 
mathematical model, or also a structure, “in the sense of relational structures for which all of the 
sentences of the theory express true properties about the structure when the latter acts as an 
interpretation of the theory” (Da Costa and French 1990, 249-250).   
 For any given theory, taken to be a set of statements, or sentences, there are families of 
models that the theory entails.  Such models exhibit relational structures, which formalists argue 
exhibit some relationship to the world.  The question is, what are the structures, and how does 
one characterize this relationship?  More recent instantiations of the formalist strategy claim this 
relationship is one of partial isomorphism, a notion which is predicated upon another one, partial 
structures.  A partial structure specifies only part of the complete relations of a definite 
mathematical entity.  According to formalists, since scientists only specify such partial relations 
when modeling phenomena, this means that philosophical representations of models only need to 
be in terms of partial relations too.  With models so understood, the philosophical work to be 
done by formalist’s methods is to depict any and all scientific models as set-theoretic structures 
so that they can be demonstrated to exhibit partial isomorphism with phenomena, qua partial 
structures. 
 If one accepts the formal techniques specified by the formalist strategy, problem number 
one at the beginning of this subsection then appears easy to solve.  Provided it is agreed that their 
formal definitions of theory, model, (partial) structure, and (partial) isomorphism are sound, then 
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they can indeed represent all the different sorts of scientific models used in empirical science.  
This is because structures are sets of entities and their partial relations.  So, any model can be so 
described, and as such can be represented by their techniques (da Costa and French, 260-260; 
French and Ladyman 1999, 107-110).  Yet, while problem one thus finds an easy resolution, this 
is decidedly not the case for problem two. 
 Recall that the central contention of the London group was that portraying models as 
being generated solely from theories will mean that such a theory-driven view will be inadequate 
for describing how theory relates to the world.  This is problem two.  Instead of directly 
describing how theory relates to the world, the formalist strategy reframes the issue; they seek to 
describe how theories relate to ‘phenomena’.  On such an account, the world is characterized 
according to its ‘appearances’, sensu van Fraassen (1980, 64).  French and Ladyman argue that 
theories, associated with the class of mathematical models they entail, do not bear any clear 
relation to the world simpliciter.  Theories qua families of models, relate to appearances, or 
phenomena, which are models of the world that can be adequately dealt with by their set 
theoretic formal approach. Accordingly, they contend that while the relationship between 
theories and empirical systems (appearances) is a complicated one, it can be captured as a 
“hierarchy of models”: 
[T]he relationship between theory and empirical reality is mediated by a series of 
representations and so the use of isomorphism and related notions is perfectly 
legitimate.  Of course there is the more profound issue of the relationship between 
the lower most representation in the hierarchy – the data model perhaps – and 
reality itself, but of course, this is hardly something that the semantic approach 
alone can be expected to address. (1999, 113; italics added) 
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 What is gained by adopting the formalist strategy is a straightforward solution to problem 
one, the fact that there are many types of models in science of which the semantic program is 
apparently intolerant. However, what is lost is any capacity to characterize the relationship of 
theories, models, and the world per se.  By such lights, models, which constitute theories, exhibit 
a profound, mysterious, relationship with the world, and the semantic program need not address 
this.   
 
2.2 The liberalist strategy for defending the semantic program  
There is another strategy for rebutting the two components of the common objection to the 
semantic approach.  This strategy is to liberalize the commitments of the view with regards to 
how one understands scientific models on the one hand, while on the other hand also liberalizing 
the characterization of how theories relate to the world.  On this strategy the gains and losses of 
the formalist strategy are swapped; what is gained is a way to represent the relationship between 
theory and world, however what is lost is any capacity to specify what exactly a model is. 
 Two examples of the liberalist strategy can be found in the work of Giere (1988, 2004) 
and Teller (2001).  Both authors decompose the complex objection launched by opponents into 
two components and argue for similar solutions to them.  According to Giere, there are many 
different kinds of models, such as “physical models, scale models, analogue models, and 
mathematical models;” furthermore, all of these models “are designed so that elements of the 
model can be identified with features of the real world…Scientists use models to represent 
aspects of the world for various purposes.  On this view it is models that are the primary (though 
by no means the only) representational tools in the sciences” (2004, 746-747; italics in original).  
By this account, models are not defined structurally, but functionally, as things scientists use to 
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represent.  This means that whatever scientists use to represent could be a model.  Yet, somehow 
Giere wishes to allow for some non-models to be representational tools.  This view puts his 
analysis in the awkward position of claiming that anything scientists use to represent can be a 
model, however some things they use to represent are not models.   
 Teller instead sidesteps this awkwardness by holding that, “in principle, anything can be 
a model” (2001, 397).  Similarly though, Teller holds that anything a model user regards or uses 
as a representation is a model. So, adopting the liberalist strategy, the challenge that the semantic 
view inaccurately proscribes what counts as a model is parried by allowing anything to be a 
model, so long as it is used to represent the world.  This of course immediately suggests the 
question of how one demarcates models from things that are non-models but are also used to 
represent.  Or, is everything a scientists uses to represent just then referred to as a model, and if 
so, does this supersede commonplace usage of the term? 
 Provided we ignore the question of how models are to be demarcated from other 
potentially representing entities, on the liberalist approach there is a straightforward way to 
characterize the relationship between theories and the world.  A theory specifies a set of models, 
and these models bear similarities to actual systems in the world.  That is why models can be 
used to represent the world and also how they relate to the world – by exhibiting similarity with 
it.  
 According to Giere, scientists use models to represent the world, and they do so “by 
picking out features of the model that are then claimed to be similar to features of the designated 
real system” (2004, 748).  This is also how Teller views the relationship of theory and model to 
world.  He contends, “models correspond to the world not by a relation of isomorphism but by a 
looser relation of similarity.”  Yet, also: “Models are connected to the world by theoretical 
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hypotheses” (Teller 2001, 395).  Theoretical hypotheses are what specify that a system in the 
world is similar to a model, as well as how it is taken to be so.  
 
2.3 The Semantic Program 
Having considered common objections to the semantic program as well as common rebuttals 
thereof, it is now possible to combine into one sketch the many available interpretations of the 
position. At a minimum, the program makes a number of commitments regarding the nature of 
scientific theories and models, as well as how they relate to the world.  Yet, though these 
commitments may be expressed in alternative ways, the core commitment of the position cannot 
be violated, which is that theories are to be identified with families of models.  I suggest that 
there are three specific qualitative parameters, which once interpreted together with the core 
commitment, constitute an interpretation of the semantic program.  These parameters are (i) 
requisite degree of formalism, (ii) specification of the notion of models, and (iii) characterization 
of the relationship between theory and world.  Table 1 summarizes how formalists, liberalists, 
and opponents can be sorted according to this approach to classifying alternative interpretations 
of the program. 
 
 Table 1 
Strategy 
 
Parameter  
Formalists Liberalists Opponents 
Is a high degree of formalism 
required? Yes No Yes 
Are models solely understood 
as mathematical? Yes No Yes 
Do theories relate to the world, 
simpliciter?  No Yes Yes 
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 Summarizing the three interpretations of the semantic view discussed above in this way 
indicates that when proponents of the view are taken together, as a group their positive position 
is essentially committed to the same interpretation offered by their opponents.  However, taken 
separately they are inaccurately represented by their opponents, yet nonetheless cannot wholly 
meet their adversaries’ objections.  This brings contemporary debates over the semantic program 
into sharp relief because it shows that opponents have high expectations of the view, which 
proponents do not share.  However, as one who would like to defend the view, I wonder whether 
this is really the case.  Is it impossible to construct a semantic view that can mirror the 
commitments expected of it by its opponents, yet also meet their objections? 
 The remainder of this essay seeks to specify a version of the semantic program that does 
meet the two-pronged objection belabored above.  To do this, it will be necessary to reconsider 
what is in many instances taken to be the view’s foundation.   
 
3. A tragic mistake: the semantic approach sensu van Fraassen  
Bas van Fraassen once said: “In any tragedy, we suspect that some crucial mistake was made at 
the very beginning”  (1987, 108).  I take the fact that contemporaneous champions of the 
semantic approach cannot articulate a defensible interpretation of their positions against a 
common objection to indicate that a crucial mistake was made in formulating shared aspects of 
their views at the very beginning.  In this section I will locate this mistake in chapter three of van 
Fraassen’s The Scientific Image.  I argue that a crucial conflation occurs there between two 
distinguishable renderings of the term ‘structure’.  This is of paramount importance because on 
many accounts of the semantic approach, the notion of structure plays an essential role in the 
definitions of familiar notions we have encountered in the discussion above, theory, model, and 
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isomorphism.  Recognizing this ambiguity suggests that it has persisted in present discussions of 
the semantic program, and is the reason that the position remains indefensible. 
 The notion of structure given found in the classic text articulating the semantic view, The 
Scientific Image, conflates a qualified, mathematical sense of structure with an unqualified, 
vernacular sense of structure.  To see this, consider how the notions of theory and model are 
introduced by way of the notion of structure (van Fraassen 1980, 41-44).  The text specifies six 
geometric axioms (A0 – A5), and states that a subset of them can be considered as a theory (A1 – 
A4).  To show that this theory is consistent, it “is easiest to show by exhibiting a simple finite 
geometric structure of which axioms A1 – A4 are true” (42).  We are next told, “Any structure 
which satisfies the axioms of a theory in this way is called a model of that theory” (1980, 42-43; 
italics in original).  Note that the adjective, ‘geometric’ has been dropped and in its place we 
have simply ‘structure’.  This surreptitious removal of the qualifier, geometric, persists as the 
notions of embeddedness and isomorphism are defined: “one structure can be embedded in 
another, if the first is isomorphic to a part (substructure) of the second. Isomorphism is of course 
total identity of structure and is a limiting case of embeddability” (43).  Consequently, though 
the articulation of the semantic program in one of its foundational interpretations begins with 
precision by defining models as geometric structures, for the most part, the essential notion of 
structure is left unqualified, and thereby ambiguous between mathematical structure and 
vernacular structure. 
 Vernacular structure is just tangible material structure familiar of everyday objects.  As 
such, houses have structure; billiard balls have structure; metal rods and pieces of tin have 
structure.  They may also have mathematical structure, however I contend this is prima facie 
distinguishable from having vernacular structure.  The crucial importance of these alternative 
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notions of structure can be made evident by again looking at the text, where the example of 
Newton’s scientific achievements concerning the nature of planetary motion is utilized as an 
example supporting the semantic program. 
 In the case of planetary motion, van Fraassen accepts and builds upon a distinction made 
by Newton between the phenomena to be saved, or apparent motion, and the reality to be 
postulated, or true motion.  On a Ptolemaic characterization of the planets, there is no distinction 
because “the true motion is exactly what is seen in the heavens” (45).  Yet, Newton postulates 
that the motion described by astronomers is motion relative to the moving earth and moving 
planets.  Thus planetary motion as recorded is relative to the earth, and hence is apparent motion.  
It is at this point that the notion of structure is invoked, which further plays on its textual 
ambiguity: “the ‘apparent motions’ form relational structures defined by measuring relative 
distances, time intervals, and angles of separation,” which van Fraassen calls “appearances.  In 
the mathematical model…we can define structures that are meant to be exact reflections of those 
appearances” (ibid; italics in original).  Here the ambiguity between mathematical and vernacular 
senses of structure is essential because one wants to know whether these appearances, qua 
mathematical structures, bear any relation to the unqualified structures one would see gazing at 
the stars. 
 The relationship between qualified (mathematical) and unqualified (vernacular) senses of 
structure may be difficult to consider when speaking of planets, so I will redraw the distinction 
by imagining not Newton’s theory of planetary motions, but of plant motions.  Specifically, let 
us imagine an apple falling from a tree, hitting Newton’s noggin, and his attempting to explain 
the occurrence.  Let us also suppose a rival (Ptolemaic) theory has offered an explanation of this 
event.  The latter theory would have it that the earth is stationary and that the apple fell along 
 
Draft as of 01.23.2009  Do not quote without permission. 
21 
some such trajectory.  Newton would demur, stating that the earth was in fact moving, and 
consequently, the apparent trajectory, or motion, was different from the real motion to be 
postulated.  According to van Fraassen, “when Newton claims empirical adequacy for his theory, 
he is claiming that his theory has some model such that all actual appearances are identifiable 
with (isomorphic to) motions in that model” (ibid; italics in original).  As such, for Newton to 
claim empirical adequacy for the theoretical description of the apple example, he would need to 
supply a model such that any and all appearances of the apple’s descent would be identifiable 
with, or isomorphic to, the motions in that model.  Given that appearances are relational 
structures defined by measurement, then we can ask Newton a question and witness the import of 
the distinction between mathematical and vernacular structure.  Do the ‘appearances’ of the 
apple’s motion have any relationship to the actual apple’s falling and bonking Newton atop the 
head? 
 Here is where the semantic program, as given in The Scientific Image, abdicates any 
resources it may have for characterizing the relationship of theory to world.  All that can be said 
of Newton’s theory is that it relates to the appearances by way of specifying models that exhibit 
isomorphism with them.  Yet, as anyone familiar with ordinary size objects such as apples, they 
have vernacular structure, which is experienced whenever one comes into contact with a token 
tangible object we routinely refer to as an apple.  But surely, we want to say something more 
about Newton’s theory.  For instance, returning to the example of planetary motion, astronauts 
who landed on Mars certainly beheld its vernacular structure, irrespective of whether the planet 
can only be understood theoretically as having mathematical structure. 
 I am arguing that the source of the present issues facing the semantic program can be 
located in a crucial mistake of ambiguously characterizing the critical notions employed by the 
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view: theory, model, and isomorphism.  Textual evidence indicates that these notions are 
ambiguously characterized because of their dependence upon an understanding of structure 
which is itself ambiguous.  What is highly problematic about this is that this ambiguity was 
neither recognized in the text, nor have other proponents of the view recognized it.  Hence those 
who would defend the semantic view might take the following quote as foundational (e.g. Giere 
1988, 49; French and Ladyman 1999, 112): 
To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and secondly, 
to specify certain parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as 
candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena.  The structures 
which can be described in experimental and measurement reports we can call 
appearances: the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all 
appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model. (van 
Fraassen 1980, 64; italics in original) 
 
Given the argument above, to take this formulation of the semantic approach as a basis for a 
contemporary defense of the position would be to inherit the ambiguity between qualified 
(mathematical) and unqualified (vernacular) senses of “structure.”  To resolve this ambiguity one 
could either stipulate that theories relate only to mathematical structures or that theories relate to 
vernacular structures, characterized in terms of actual systems in the world.  As depicted in Table 
1 above, this is exactly what proponents of the semantic approach have done.  Formalists opt for 
the former strategy while liberalists opt for the latter.   
 One might be disposed to respond to the foregoing remarks by claiming that nowhere in 
The Scientific Image is it argued that theories relate to the world, and consequently, those who 
take the liberalist or oppositionist approaches above are simply misguided.  However, it would 
then be difficult to make sense of a discussion therein of Suppes’ interpretation of the semantic 
view, an interpretation which utilizes the same distinctions as van Fraassen:  
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[W]hile I consider the work of Suppes’s account of the structure of scientific 
theories an excellent vehicle for the elucidation of these general distinctions, I do 
regard it as relatively shallow.  In this book I am mainly concerned with the 
relation between physical theories and the world rather than with that other main 
topic, the structure of physical theory. (van Fraassen 1980, 67; italics added) 
 
Therefore, while the majority of the arguments in The Scientific Image aim at articulating an 
anti-realist interpretation of the semantic program, one does find there an occasional instance 
where a surreptitious realism lingers.  This is most evident in the conflation between qualified 
and unqualified senses of structure.  To remedy this, I will now move to consider the semantic 
program, as articulated by Suppes. 
 
4. Of theories and world, models and experience: Patrick Suppes 
Though Suppes is widely credited with being an early champion of the semantic view, his 
contribution is predominantly described only in terms of formal methods useful for articulating 
the position (e.g. Suppe 1974; Da Costa and French 1990; Schaffner 1993).  On this reading, one 
finds emphasis primarily upon Suppes’ publications containing his set-theoretic formalisms (e.g. 
Suppes 1957, 1960, 1962).  However, in these and elsewhere (e.g. 1967), Suppes expresses 
additional informal characteristics of his interpretation of the semantic view.  Only by paying 
due attention to these statements can we save the semantic view. 
 From the standpoint of the present discussion, I will assume that Suppes’ formalisms are 
quite useful, as indicated by the role they have played in the interpretation of the semantic 
program given by the formalists discussed above.  As such, they will not be considered further 
here, either positively or negatively. Yet, I note that Suppes’ work contains the formalisms 
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opponents have taken as a hallmark of the semantic view.  As such, this is one resource his work 
contains. 
 Another resource one can find in Suppes’ work is a pluralistic, permissive 
characterization of models.  In his (1960) article on the meaning and uses of models in 
mathematics and empirical sciences, Suppes quotes a number of publications where the term 
‘models’ is employed.  Suppes states that the quotes are taken from publications in 
“mathematical logic… physics… the social sciences… [and] mathematical statistics.”  Yet,  
“Additional uses of the word ‘model’ could easily be collected in another batch of quotes.  One 
of the more prominent senses of the word missing in the above is… an actual physical model” 
([1960] 1969, 11).  Suppes then claims that the logical concept of model “may be used without 
distortion and as a fundamental concept in all of the disciplines from which the above quotations 
are drawn.  In this sense I would assert that the meaning of the concept of model is the same in 
mathematics and the empirical sciences” (12).  What is essential here is that Suppes does not 
claim that the meaning of the concept of model is the same in mathematics and logic as it is in 
the empirical sciences, tout court.  On the contrary, Suppes qualifies his claim by saying that 
only insofar as the logical sense of model fits with the quoted instances of empirical sciences can 
it be said to exhibit the same meaning as the empirical sciences.  Importantly, these instances do 
not include any examples from biology, medicine, or psychology. 
 Others have interpreted the above passages as making an unqualified claim that the 
models of mathematical logic and the empirical sciences are the same (e.g. French and Ladyman 
1999, 106).  This is an egregious error because it downplays Suppes pluralism to the point of 
suppressing it altogether.  Later in the same essay, Suppes summarizes his efforts regarding the 
meaning of models as follows:  
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I have tried to argue that the concept of model used by mathematical logicians is 
the basic and fundamental concept of model needed for an exact statement of any 
branch of empirical science.  To agree with this statement it is not necessary to 
rule out or to deplore variant uses or variant concepts of model… I am myself 
prepared to admit the significance and practical importance of the notion of 
physical model. (17; italics added) 
 
Rather than assert that the logical notion is the same as that found in empirical sciences, Suppes 
is admirably far more cautious and articulate.  He states that the mathematical notion of model is 
needed for constructing an exact statement of any branch of empirical science.  This is patently 
different from a claim that the alternative notions of model are identical.   
 As further evidence of Suppes’ pluralistic characterization of models, I submit his 
development of the notion of models of data. In “Models of Data,” Suppes (1962) attempts to 
represent data generated from experiments using formal methods.  Depicting this data, Suppes 
notes that there are “obvious respects in which a possible realization of the theory cannot be a 
possible realization of experimental data” (Suppes [1962] 1969, 26).  These respects are that an 
experiment cannot include an infinite number of trials, nor are certain theoretical parameters 
directly observable in the sense that they can be experienced during the course of experiment.  
While Suppes does believe that models of data have the same logical structure as models of 
theory, he argues that they are distinguishable entities, or distinct types of models. 
 Thus, in two works often cited solely for their formal apparatus, Suppes distinguishes 
between at least three types of models, models of theory, models of data, and physical models.  
He also welcomes attempts to clarify alternative notions of model and incorporate them into a 
coherent interpretation of the semantic view.  Therefore, it is should be recognized that a second 
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conceptual resource may be found in Suppes’ work; namely, that the notion of models on Suppes 
articulation of the semantic view is not exclusively that of the mathematical logician.   
 There is another, final, and essential, resource contained in Suppes articulation of the 
semantic view, which is the characterization of the relationship between theory and world.  
According to Suppes, theory relates to world by way of models, which relate to experience in a 
complex way.  This way of characterizing the relationship between theory and world is discussed 
in a number of Suppes’ works (e.g. [1960] 1969, 20; [1962] 1969, 34; 1969, 3-4; 1993, 12).  
However, it is most eloquently expressed in his (1967) article, “What is a Scientific Theory?”.  
Here Suppes notes that the (then) standard sketch of theories comes in two parts, the first 
representing theories in terms of “an abstract logical calculus”, and the second providing “co-
ordinating definitions” of that calculus in order to apply it to the world (56).  After suggesting a 
characterization of theories by the semantic view as a way to complement and extend the first 
part of the standard sketch, he then suggests to the reader how the second part ought to be 
reconsidered.  He says: 
The concrete experience that scientists label an experiment cannot itself be 
connected to a theory in any complete sense.  That experience must be put 
through a conceptual grinder that in many cases is excessively coarse.  Once the 
experience is passed through the grinder, often in the form of the quite 
fragmentary records of the complete experiment, the experimental data emerge in 
canonical form and constitute a model of the experiment.  It is this model of the 
experiment rather than a model of the theory for which co-ordinating definitions 
are provided.  It is also characteristic that the model of the experiment is of 
relatively different logical type from that of the model of the theory.” (62-63; 
italics added) 
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If we ignore Suppes metaphor of putting experience through a conceptual grinder in order 
to get a model of the experiment, this passage fits quite well with the formalist 
interpretation of the semantic program above.  This reading would have it that theories 
relate to appearances, or data models, rather than the world, per se.  Yet, such a reading 
would also do injustice to Suppes’ insight; that theories relate to models of experiment, or 
canonical representations of data, and these relate to the world through a scientist’s 
active experimentation.   
 The work of Patrick Suppes contains the necessary resources to save the semantic 
view because it takes on the profound issue of how theories relate to the world while also 
remaining pluralistic with regards to how models can be conceived.  And, this is all 
performed within a formal framework, though it has been suppressed here.  However, 
while Suppes’ interpretation of the semantic approach does offer needed resources, they 
remain woefully underdeveloped.  Of utmost importance is the fact that the relationship 
between models and experience, and thereby theory and world, which is predicated upon 
it, is so sketchy as to seem almost useless.  I say almost though because it so strongly 
points in the right direction. 
 On Suppes account of the semantic view, it would be unlikely that the notions of 
isomorphism or similarity will be sufficient to capture what he calls, “ the maddeningly 
diverse and complex experience which constitutes an experiment” ([1960] 1969, 20).  
Suppes’ position certainly incorporates a ‘hierarchy of models view’ as seen on the 
formalist strategy above.  As such, isomorphism would be able to characterize some 
relationships in a hierarchy, and even all relationships down to the level of models of 
data.  Yet, something more will be necessary to characterize how low level models relate 
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to experience.  Despite this, by analyzing the foundations of the semantic program, it is 
possible to demonstrate that the semantic view does have something to say about how 
theories relate to the world.  While more must be said on this head, this should be enough 
to placate the position’s critics. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that the semantic view is actually a loose confederation of views, as 
evidenced by the fact that it has no clear point of origin in any single author or 
collaborative set of authors.  That this is the case also enjoys support from the status of 
present debates concerning the adequacy of the semantic program.  The analysis above 
demonstrates that present-day proponents of the position can be separated into two 
camps, and that neither of these camps can alone adequately defend the common complex 
objection put to them.  In this sense, the semantic program is inadequate as routinely 
interpreted in philosophy of science today. 
 To save the semantic view, I have suggested that the source of error leading to its 
current status can in part be located in a classic text articulating the view; furthermore, I 
argue that by reorienting the position towards the work of Suppes, this error can be 
overcome.  The principle error I diagnose occurs in chapter three of The Scientific Image, 
where the crucial notion of structure is ambiguously characterized.  As this notion is used 
to define the other notions in the semantic theorist’s arsenal, I contend they all suffer 
from its ambiguity.  What is essential about this ambiguity is that if it remains 
unacknowledged, the position cannot simultaneously be permissive in its understanding 
of models as well as say anything about the relationship of theory to the world.  By 
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returning to Suppes’ work, we can keep the important distinctions needed for the view, 
and at the same time characterize how theories relate to the world, which is by way of 
models that relate to experimental experience.  What remains to be done is to pick up 
where Suppes left off and develop an account of the activity of experimentation in terms 
of how it leads to model building, the results of which can ultimately be related to theory. 
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